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 “There is no way in which the consumer can avoid revealing his preferences in a spatial 
economy.  Spatial mobility provides the local public-goods counterpart to the private 
market’s shopping trip.”  --Charles Tiebout (1956) 
 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
50 years ago, Charles Tiebout suggested that consumers reveal their preferences for local 
public goods by the residential locations they choose.  Epple and Sieg (1999) were the 
first to implement Tiebout’s revealed preference logic by using the properties of 
equilibrium in the housing market to estimate households’ heterogeneous preferences for 
local public goods.  In their analysis, households choose where to live based on their 
(exogenous) income and their preferences for the unique bundle of local public goods 
provided by each of a discrete set of urban communities.  Households are depicted as 
differing in their tastes for the bundle of public goods, but they are restricted to evaluate 
its constituent elements in the same way.  This feature, labeled vertical differentiation, 
implies all households agree on a single ranking of communities by an index of the public 
goods they provide.  
  Relaxing vertical differentiation is important because it is reasonable to expect 
that different households will evaluate components of a vector of local public goods quite 
differently.  For example, households with school age children may be more concerned 
about school quality while retirees may place more emphasis on climate and other 
environmental amenities.  While several microeconometric strategies have been proposed 
for the situation where households differ in their relative preferences (i.e. horizontal 
differentiation), none have used the properties of a market equilibrium to recover 
preferences in a way that is consistent with equilibrium capitalization of local public 
goods (Starrett [1981] and Scotchmer [1985]).      
Equally important is the need to recognize that working households make two 
related location choices—the choice of a house and the choice of a job.  Rosen (1979) 
suggested that because households can make adjustments in both markets, we should 
expect both wage rates and house prices to reflect the demand for local public goods.  
Despite empirical evidence in support of Rosen’s insight, most economists have focused   2
exclusively on the housing component of location choice as a means to infer households’ 
valuation of amenities.  The few existing studies that model adjustment in both markets 
use reduced form models that restrict preferences to be homogeneous and limit the 
analysis to marginal changes (e.g. Roback [1982]) and Blomquist et al. [1988]).   
  This paper describes a new structural estimator that meets both objectives, while 
nesting Epple and Sieg’s (1999) model as a special case and extending Epple, Peress, and 
Sieg’s (2005) semiparametric identification strategy to the case where households differ 
in their relative preferences for multiple public goods.  More precisely, the new estimator 
is based on the information provided by location choices in a market equilibrium derived 
from households that have horizontally differentiated preferences for public goods and 
differ in their job skill.  It recognizes that observed location choices provide set 
identification of the heterogeneous preference parameters.  That is, the estimator recovers 
a set of values for the parameters that describe how local public goods contribute to 
sorting behavior.  To attach values from this set to the population of households requires 
additional assumptions about the distribution of each preference parameter.  A key 
feature of the new estimator is that it uses the set identification logic to distinguish the 
identifying power of structural restrictions on the indirect utility function from the 
identifying power of maintained assumptions about the distribution of preferences.   
To evaluate the implications of introducing a joint job-house choice and 
heterogeneous relative preferences into an equilibrium sorting model, the new “dual-
market” estimator and Epple and Sieg’s model are both used to recover preferences for 
public goods in Northern California’s two largest population centers: the San Francisco 
and Sacramento Consolidated Metropolitan Statistical Areas.  This region is divided into 
122 housing communities and 8 work destinations, and each (community, worksite) pair 
is assigned a price of housing, a set of public goods, a set of wage rates, and a commute 
time.  Both models are used to explain the location choices made by households in each 
of 22 occupational categories, where wage options differ for each category in the dual-
market case.  Results from the estimation are used to construct distributions of the 
marginal willingness-to-pay for improved air quality.  Moving from Epple and Sieg’s   3
model to the new “dual-market” framework increases estimates for the average 
per/household marginal willingness-to-pay by as much as 190%. 
  Section 2 reviews the logic of Tiebout sorting in the context of Epple and Sieg’s 
(1999) framework and discusses how structural restrictions allow preferences for public 
goods to be inferred from observed house locations.  Then the choice set is expanded to 
include the labor market and a single-crossing restriction is used to characterize 
equilibrium sorting behavior.  Section 3 describes the empirical model and the estimator.  
Then section 4 introduces the data and section 5 compares the results from implementing 
the new estimator to the results from two special cases—the Epple-Sieg model and an 
intermediate version of the model that admits horizontal differentiation but treats wage 
income as exogenous.  After interpreting the results, section 6 concludes.   
 
2.  THEORY 
Tiebout’s locational sorting model assumes, ceteris paribus, heterogeneous households 
select a community based on its local public goods.  Suppose the urban landscape can be 
divided into a finite set of J housing communities, each of which differs in its price of 
housing ( j p ) and in its exogenous provision of local public goods such as school quality, 
crime, and environmental amenities.  Households differ in the relative importance they 
assign to each public good.  Let γ  represent relative preferences for public goods, and 
() γ j g  represent composite provision of public goods in community j as perceived by a 
− γ type household.  Each household chooses the community that maximizes its utility, 
given its exogenous income ( y ) and its preferences (α ) for the composite public good 
relative to private goods.  For heuristic purposes, utility maximization can be depicted as 
a two-stage problem, where each household first determines the optimal quantities of 
housing and numeraire in every community and then chooses the community that 
maximizes its utility.  The first stage is shown as equation (1).  
 
(1) 
() () [] b y ph to subject b h g U
b h − = α γ , , , max
, . 
   4
Conditional on a community, households choose quantities of housing (h) and a 
composite private good (b) to maximize their utility subject to the budget constraint.  
Assume that zoning does not constrain housing construction.  Then households can 
purchase any quantity of housing at the market price in each community, in which case 
preferences can be restated using the indirect utility function in (2). 
 
(2)    () [] () ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [] α α γ α γ γ α γ , , , , , , , , , , , , y p g ph y y p g h g U y p g V − = . 
 
Assuming households are price-takers and can move freely between communities, each 
household will choose the community that maximizes its well-being, given income and 
prices.   
 
2.1.  Identifying Heterogeneous Preferences from Structural Restrictions 
 
Two types of structural restrictions are required to point-identify households’ preferences 
based on their observed location choices.  First, a parametric indirect utility function must 
be selected.  Second, a distribution must be specified for each preference parameter in 
that function used to characterize household heterogeneity.  Each restriction makes a 
different type of contribution to the identification.   
Distributional assumptions are necessary due to the discreteness in the choice set.  
When household i chooses j from a finite set of communities, utility maximization is 
characterized by the set of inequalities in equation (3).
  
 
(3)  () [ ] ( ) [] J k y p g V y p g V i i k i k i i i j i j i ,..., 1 , , , , , , , , , = ∀ ≥ α γ α γ . 
   
Given a parametric form for the indirect utility function, the inequalities provide set 
identification of the heterogeneous preference parameters.  It must be the case that 
()j i i i A , , ∈ γ α , where  () ( ) ( ) { } 3 , : , , satisfies A i i i i j i γ α γ α = .  In words, the choice of 
community j reveals only that household i’s preferences lie somewhere in the j i A ,  set.  
Imposing a distribution on () γ α,  allows the analyst to identify the density of preferences   5
within j i A , .   
  To illustrate the role of each type of restriction in identifying preferences, 
consider a specific example using the following CES indirect utility function: 
 
() [] () () [] {}
01 .
1
01 . 04 . 25 . 01 .
, 54 4 exp 79 . , , ,
− − − − + = j i j i i p y g y p g V α α γ ,   
  
where  j school i j air i j i SCHOOL AIR g , , , γ γ + = .
1 
 
The first term represents utility from public goods, and the second term represents utility 
from the private good component of housing.  Households differ in their income and in 
their preferences for a linear index of two public goods that differentiate communities, air 
quality and school quality.  There are two components of preference heterogeneity.  
Households differ in the relative weights they assign to each public good in the index 
( school i air i , , ,γ γ ) and in the overall strength of their preferences for public goods relative to 
private goods ( i α ).  The weights are assumed to sum to 1 so that  i α  represents a scaling 
parameter on the strength of preferences.  Suppose households maximize their utility by 
sorting among the following four communities: { } 00 . 1 , 25 . 1 , 25 . 1 1 1 1 = = = p SCHOOL AIR , 
{} 25 . 1 , 65 . 1 , 85 . 1 2 2 2 = = = p SCHOOL AIR , { } 26 . 1 , 86 . 1 , 66 . 1 3 3 3 = = = p SCHOOL AIR , and 
{} 50 . 1 , 00 . 2 , 00 . 2 4 4 4 = = = p SCHOOL AIR , where higher values for AIR and SCHOOL indicate 
higher quality. 
To see how the form of the indirect utility function provides set identification of 
preferences, first consider Epple and Sieg’s (1999) vertically differentiated model.  In this 
case all the variation in tastes can be condensed into a single heterogeneous parameter 
that ranks locations by “quality”.  The CES utility function simplifies to this case when 
households are constrained to have the same relative preferences for the two public 
goods.  For example, let the weights be: ( ) ( ) i school i air i ∀ ≡ , 52 . 0 , 48 . 0 , , , γ γ .  With constant 
                                                 
1 This CES function provides the basis for the subsequent structural model.  Specifically, it is the indirect 
utility function from equation (12) with 2 = β ,  963 . − = η ,  75 . = ν , and  01 . − = ρ .  If the weights in the 
public goods index are constant, it reduces to the form of the indirect utility function in Epple-Sieg (1999).      6
weights, all households agree on a common ranking of communities by the public goods 
index, and sort according to their income and i α .  By conditioning on income, the system 
in (3) can be solved for the bounds of the  i α  sets that rationalize each location choice.  
At y=$50,000, the partition of α  corresponds to:   
 




This illustrates two limitations of set identification.  First, preferences are not point 
identified within the bounds of a set.  The choice of community 2 reveals only that the 
household’s preferences lie somewhere in 2 , i A : 19 . 1 01 . 1 ≤ ≤ i α .  Second, the preference 
set that corresponds to the highest (lowest) provision of public goods is not bounded from 
above (below) by the revealed preference logic in (3).  These two limitations require that 
a distribution be specified for  i α .  This added information transforms the observed 
location choices by a population of households into a distribution of preferences.   
When vertical differentiation is relaxed, observed location choices are required to 
set identify more heterogeneous preference parameters.  Horizontal differentiation 
implies households differ in their relative preferences for the two public goods; i.e. 
( ) school i air i , , ,γ γ  varies across households.  This generalization increases the dimensionality 
of the partition.  Figure 1 partitions preference space into regions that rationalize each of 
the four community choices at y=$50,000.  The figure illustrates how the identifying 
power of the indirect utility function differs under vertical and horizontal differentiation.  
In the vertical case the choice of community 2 indicates that the household’s preferences 
belong to the set: ( 19 . 1 01 . 1 , 48 . ≤ ≤ = α γ air ), which appears in figure 1 as the horizontal 
line in the lower left corner of the 2 , i A  region.   2 , i A  is the preference set identified by the 
choice of community 2 in the horizontal case.  This comparison illustrates a general 
principle:  preference sets revealed by vertically differentiated sorting are subsets of their 
horizontally differentiated counterparts.   
Ai,1 
∞ −     ∞  1.01  1.19  2.13 















FIGURE 1.—Partitioning Preference Space, Horizontal Differentiation (γschool +γair=1) 
    
  Figure 1 also illustrates how structural restrictions on the utility function control 
the scope of substitution patterns.  With vertical differentiation each community has at 
most two substitutes, the adjacent communities in the ranking by public goods.
2  With 
horizontal differentiation the total number of substitutes for each community falls 
between 2 and J, depending on the number of choices relative to the number of public 
goods (Anderson, DePalma and Thisse [1992]).  The communities that are substitutes 
will share “borders” in the partition of preference space.  Community 2, for example, 
shares borders with each of the other three communities in figure 1.  Consider a marginal 
increase in the price of housing in community 2.  Households that currently reside in 2 
but have preferences on the border between 2&4 will respond to the price increase by 
moving to community 4.  Likewise, households on the borders between 2&1 and 2&3 
will move to communities 1 and 3.  In general, locations that are similar in terms of 
prices and public goods are more likely to be substitutes than those that are not.  Notice 
that in figure 1 the two communities with intermediate levels of public goods, 2 and 3, 
                                                 
2 The definition of substitution used here is defined as “strong gross substitution” in Anderson, DePalma 
and Thisse (1992), where k is a substitute for j iff  0 > ∂ ∂ j k P h . 
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share borders with each of the other three locations while the most and least expensive 
locations, 1 and 4, do not share a border.  Because locations 1 and 4 are furthest removed 
in terms of prices and public goods, it seems natural to expect that there are few, if any, 
households that consider them to be close substitutes.     
 
2.2.  Introducing the Labor Market 
 
For working households there are two dimensions of location choice—the choice of a 
house and the choice of a job.  Intuition and recent empirical research suggest these two 
choices are interrelated (Rhode and Strumpf [2003]).  This section expands the 
theoretical model to allow households with heterogeneous job skills to simultaneously 
sort among housing communities and labor markets.  Under these conditions, the levels 
of public goods will affect behavior in both markets (Rosen [1979], Roback [1982]).  
Thus, one might expect job locations to convey additional identifying information about 
preferences.  A single crossing restriction on preferences leads to three properties that 
must characterize sorting behavior for every household “type” in any locational 
equilibrium.  These properties guarantee that housing and labor market choices convey 
sufficient information to recover preferences.  The primary difference between these 
properties and the ones derived in Epple and Sieg (1999) arises because a multiplicity of 
types implies sorting behavior that is less restrictive.  
Let the urban landscape be divided into K labor markets that differ in the wage 
paid to workers of each job skill.  With J housing communities and K labor markets, each 
(j,k) pair represents a unique job-house combination, which will be referred to as a 
“location” and denoted by k j L , .  Each location requires a specific commute.  For a 
household that commutes between j and k, let ( ) θ k j w ,  represent wage earnings less the 
value of time spent commuting, where θ is a vector describing job skill and the shadow 
value of time.  Then, a household’s income equals  ( ) θ k j w y , ˆ + , its exogenous non-wage 
income ( y ˆ ) plus its “virtual wage income”.   
Utility maximization is similar to (1)-(2), except that households now optimize   9
over two dimensions of location choice and a budget constraint that varies across 
locations.  Equation (4) shows the utility maximization problem for household i.  
 
(4)  () [] k j i i j i j
k j
k j y p g V L , , ,
*
, , , , max α γ =  ,   where  ( ) i k j i k j i w y y θ , , , ˆ + = . 
 
Holding the community fixed at j, a utility-maximizing household will always choose to 
work in the labor market that provides it with the highest virtual wage income, given its 
job skills.  Let  () θ j w ˆ  represent the maximum effective wage income that can be obtained 
by a household living in community j.  Then (4) can be rewritten as (5), with k optimized 
out of the expression. 
 
(5)  () [] j i i j i j
j
j y p g V L ,
* , , , max α γ =  ,   where  ( ) i j i j i w y y θ ˆ ˆ , + = . 
 
For each () θ γ,  “type” household, the relevant choice set can be further reduced 
to a subset of the J communities.  This is because, conditional on values for γ  and θ , 
some communities may be dominated.  A community is dominated if there is another 
with more public goods and either a sufficiently lower price, a sufficiently higher 
effective wage, or both.  For example, given  ( ) ( ) γ γ 2 1 g g > ,  community 1 dominates 
community 2 if prices and effective wages are defined such that: 2 1 P P <  and 
() () θ θ 2 1 ˆ ˆ w w > .  No utility-maximizing ( )− θ γ, type would ever locate in community 2.  
Let R denote the total number of communities that are not dominated.  Then equation (6) 
shows how the relevant choice set for each ( )− θ γ, type relates to the set of all 
communities in (5), and to the set of all locations in (4). 
 
(6)  {} {} {} θ γ θ γ θ γ , | ,..., , | ,..., , | ,..., , 1 , 1 1 1 K J J R L L L L L L ⊂ ⊂ . 
 
Imposing a single crossing restriction on preferences makes it possible to 
characterize how, in equilibrium, households of each ( )− θ γ, type must be sorted across 
the R communities that are not dominated for that type.  Equation (7) shows the slope of   10
an “indirect indifference curve” in ( ) p g,  space. 
 
(7)  () () [] () () [ ]
() () [] p w y p g V




w y p g M
∂ ∂
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, ˆ , , ,
, ˆ , , ,.  
 
Assuming M is monotonically increasing in ( ) θ γ α , , | ˆ y  and ( ) θ γ α , , ˆ | y , indifference 
curves in the () p g,  plane satisfy single crossing in  y ˆ and α  conditional on relative 
preferences, job skills, and the shadow value of time.  This restriction has an intuitive 
interpretation.  Roy’s Identity implies that  () p V ∂ ⋅ ∂ −  must equal the marginal utility of 
income,  () y V ∂ ⋅ ∂ = λ , times the Marshallian demand for housing, ( )( ) [ ] θ α γ w y p g h , ˆ , , , .   
 
































The term in brackets in equation (8) is the Marshallian virtual price of public goods.  
Therefore, the single crossing restriction implies that the Marshallian virtual price, per 
unit of housing, is strictly increasing in income and in preferences for public goods 
relative to private goods.
3  
  The single crossing property implies that, in equilibrium, three properties 
characterize sorting by each household type: boundary indifference, stratification, and 
non-decreasing bundles.
4  Without loss of generality, let the R locations be ordered 
according to their perceived provision of public goods,  ( ) ( ) γ γ R g g < <... 1 .  Boundary 
indifference requires a household on the “border” between two locations in () y ˆ , α  space 
to be exactly indifferent between those locations.  Equation (9) defines the set of border 
                                                 
3 This property is related to the Willig condition that is often applied together with weak complementarity 
to identify the Hicksian willingness to pay for changes in public goods.  The Willig condition requires the 
willingness-to-pay per unit of the weak complement to be constant at all levels of income.  See Smith and 
Banzhaf (2004) or Palmquist (2005) for details.  
 
4 Boundary indifference and stratification follow from the proof of proposition 1 in Epple and Sieg (1999) 
because income is separable in non-wage income and effective wage income.  To see why non-decreasing 
bundles must hold, suppose equation (10) fails for some (r,r+1) pair.  Then r must have fewer perceived 
public goods, more expensive housing, and lower effective wage income.  If so, r+1 dominates r, which 
implies  R r∉ , a contradiction.     11
individuals.  It must hold for all  1 ,..., 1 − = R r . 
 
(9)  () () () [] () () [] {} θ α γ θ α γ θ γ α 1 1 1 ˆ , ˆ , , , ˆ , ˆ , , , : , | ˆ , + + + = r r r r r r w y p g V w y p g V y  .  
 
The non-decreasing bundles property requires that for any two locations in the ordering, 
() 1 , + r r  equation (10) must hold. 
 
(10)  () () () ()
both or
w w
or p p g g
r r







1 1 > > ⇒ >
+
+ + . 
 
The equation implies that households must “pay” for the additional public goods 
provided by higher ranked locations through housing prices, effective wage income, or 
both.  The third property, stratification, requires that households of each type are 
stratified across the R ordered locations by ( ) y ˆ | α  and by ( ) α | ˆ y , as defined in (11). 
 
(11) 
() ( ) ( )
() ( ) () θ γ α θ γ α θ γ α
θ γ α θ γ α θ γ α
, , ˆ | , , ˆ | , , ˆ |














In the special case where wage income is exogenous to location choice and 
households are vertically differentiated, the three sorting properties reduce to the ones 
derived in Epple and Sieg (1999).  While the three conditions are necessary for a 
locational equilibrium to exist, they are not sufficient.  Any locational equilibrium must 
also be characterized by a set of housing prices and wage rates such that no household 
could increase its utility by changing locations, and all locations are occupied.  The 
estimation strategy in this paper follows Epple and Sieg by recovering values for the 
preference parameters that justify observed location choices under the assumption that 
those choices reflect a locational equilibrium.
5   
 
                                                 
5 Epple and Platt (1998) and Sieg et al. (2004) demonstrate existence numerically when income is 
exogenous and preferences are vertically differentiated.   12
3.  ESTIMATION 
  Indirect Utility Function 
 
To simplify notation in what follows, let locations  ( ) ( ) K J k j , ,..., 1 , 1 , =  be indexed by 
Z z ,..., 1 = .  Working households are assumed to possess one of S different observable 
occupations and every household may differ in its preferences ( i i i θ γ α , , ), so households 
are indexed by both i and s.  Then the indirect utility obtained by household i,s in location 
z can be expressed as (12).  
 




















































z z s i
z i i z s i
P y
g V  
 
where   z N i z N N i z i z i g g g ξ γ γ γ , , 1 1 , , 1 1 , , ... + + + = − − ,   and   ( ) z s i z s i i z s i t w y y , 2 , , 1 , , , 1 ˆ θ θ − + = . 
 
The first term in the CES function represents utility from public goods, and the second 
represents utility from the private good component of housing.  All households are 
assumed to share the same elasticity of substitution between public and private goods 
(ρ ) as well as the same housing demand parameters: price elasticity (η), income 
elasticity (ν ), and demand intercept (β ).  The signs of these parameters provide a test on 
the consistency of the theoretical model.  With  0 < η ,  0 > ν , and  0 > β , the single 
crossing restriction implies  0 < ρ . 
Households have horizontally differentiated preferences over a linear index of 
public goods,  z i g , .  Of the N public goods in the index, N-1 are observable.  The N
th 
public good ( z z N g ξ = , ) is not observed by the econometrician.
 6  Households differ in the 
weights they place on each public good in the index ( ) N i i , 1 , ,....,γ γ  and in their overall 
preferences for public goods relative to private goods ( ) i α .  The weights are assumed to 
sum to 1, allowing  i α  to be identified separately as a scaling parameter on the strength of 
                                                 
6  z ξ  can be interpreted as a composite index of all the unobserved public goods under the restriction that 
they are vertical characteristics; i.e. the weights in the index of unobserved public goods are all constants.   13
preferences. 
As in the theoretical model, a household’s income is defined by the sum of its 
exogenous non-wage income and wage income, less the value of time spent commuting.  
The primary earner of each household is assumed to possess skills that qualify them for a 
certain occupation (e.g. biomedical engineer, locksmith).  This is the observable 
component of job skill indexed by s.  In the labor market represented by z, the average 
wage for that occupation is  z s w , .  However, a worker’s ability to collect that wage if they 
were to move from their current job depends on (unobserved) idiosyncratic features of 
their job skill (e.g. education, experience, ability).  These features are reflected in a single 
heterogeneous parameter,  1 , i θ , that represents each worker’s labor market mobility within 
their occupation.  For example, if  1 , i θ  is greater (less) than 1, the worker would earn more 
(less) than the average wage for their occupation if they were to move to a new labor 
market.  The wage in each job location is adjusted for required commute time.   z s t ,  is the 
ratio of commute time to work time, and  2 , i θ  represents the shadow value of time as a 
share of the wage rate.  If 0 2 , = i θ , effective wage income equals actual wage income.  At 
the other extreme, if  1 2 , = i θ , the worker’s shadow value of time equals their wage rate.   
The richness in the specification for utility poses two key challenges for the 
inversion process underlying the revealed preference logic of the estimation.  It must 
account for the presence of unobserved public goods and allow for heterogeneity in a 
subset of the structural parameters.  Epple and Sieg (1999), Bayer, McMillan, and 
Reuben (2005), and Epple, Peress, and Seig (2005) have all developed estimators that 
address these challenges.  However, they each require additional restrictions on the shape 
of the utility function and assumptions for the distribution of heterogeneous parameters 
that can be viewed as restrictions on (12).  The specification for utility used by Bayer, 
McMillan, and Reuben would restrict public goods to be perfectly substitutable with the 
private good component of housing (i.e. 1 = ρ ).  Moreover, their estimator treats job 
locations as fixed so that wage income is exogenous to location choice.  Epple and Sieg 
restrict income to be exogenous to location choice, households to have vertically   14
differentiated preferences for public goods, and the joint distribution of preferences and 
income to be lognormal.  Equation (12) reduces to their specification when  1 , i θ  and  2 , i θ  
are dropped along with the i subscripts from ( ) N γ γ γ ,...., , 2 1 , and  ( ) y f , α  is lognormal.  
Epple, Peress, and Seig relax the need for parametric assumptions on the joint 
distribution of income and preferences, but still require vertical differentiation and 
exogenous income.  Rather than restrict the indirect utility function to satisfy the 
assumptions needed to implement the existing structural estimators, the remainder of this 
section develops a new approach.  
The new estimator can be decomposed into two stages.  The first stage                 
recovers the price of housing in each community ( J p p ,..., 1 ) and the homogeneous 
housing demand parameters ( ν η β , , ).  These results are treated as known constants 
during the second stage of the estimation, which simultaneously recovers a composite 
unobserved public good for each community ( J ξ ξ ,..., 1 ), the homogeneous CES 
parameter (ρ ), and a partition of preference space for the heterogeneous 
parameters () θ γ α , , A . 
 
  First Stage Estimation  
  
In the theoretical model, housing is treated as a homogeneous commodity that can be 
consumed in continuous quantities.  Under this assumption, the price of housing reflects 
the cost of consuming the public goods provided by each community.  Of course, in 
practice housing is not homogenous.  Its structural characteristics (e.g. bedrooms, 
bathrooms, sqft.) vary within and between communities, and these differences will be 
reflected in observable sale prices.  This can be addressed if we are prepared to assume 
that the structural characteristics of housing enter the direct utility function through a sub-
function that is homogeneous of degree one and separable from the effect of public goods 
and the numeraire.  Under this restriction, Sieg et al. (2002) demonstrate that the 
equilibrium locus of housing expenditures defined by a hedonic price function will be 
separable in the structural characteristics of houses and the effect of public goods, as   15
shown in (13).  
 
(13)   () ( ) j j N j j n j n j g g p h h e ξ , ,..., , 1 , 1 , , − ⋅ = . 
 
The left side of the expression represents expenditures on house n in community j.  The 
first term on the right side is a “quantity” index of housing that depends on a vector of 
structural characteristics ( n j h , ).  By condensing all the information about the structural 
characteristics of a house into a single number, the index provides an empirical analog to 
the concept of a homogeneous unit of housing from the theoretical model.  The second 
term represents the price of a homogeneous unit of housing in community j, which 
depends on the public goods it provides, observed and unobserved.  Taking logs of (13) 
produces the housing price hedonic model in (14), where  n j, μ  represents measurement 
error.  
 
(14)   () () [] ( ) [ ] n j j j N j j n j n j g g p h h e , , 1 , 1 , , , ,..., ln ln ln μ ξ + + = − . 
 
Given a parametric form for (14) and data on housing transaction prices and their 
structural characteristics, the price of housing in each community can be recovered as a 
community-specific fixed effect.   
Estimates for the price of housing can be used along with data on housing 
expenditures and household income to recover the homogenous housing demand 
parameters ( ν η β , , ).  Using Roy’s Identity, an individual household’s demand for 
housing can be derived from the indirect utility function as equation (15).   
 
(15)  
ν η β i z i y p h = . 
 
Multiplying both sides of (15) by the price of housing and taking logs produces the 
expression for housing expenditures in (16), where expenditures are assumed to be 
measured with error ( j ε ).  The N superscript indicates that the expression is evaluated 
for a household at the Nth quantile in the income distribution for community j.  The   16
intercept in the demand for housing can be estimated together with the price and income 
elasticities by regressing quantiles of the distribution of annualized housing 
expenditures,
N
j e , on the price of housing and quantiles of the income distribution,
N
j y .  
While a single quantile is sufficient to identify the demand parameters, adding data on 
additional quantiles can increase the efficiency of the estimation.    
 




j y p e ε ν η β + + + + = ln ln 1 ln ln . 
 
Since housing prices were estimated as fixed effects in a hedonic regression of (14), they 
will be measured with error.  The observable public goods can be used as instruments for 
price to address the potential endogeneity problem.  In addition, non-wage income can be 
used as an instrument for income, which will be endogenous if a worker’s wage income 
depends on their residential location choice.  Assuming the error terms in (16) are 
uncorrelated across different quantiles of the distribution of income and expenditures, the 
quantiles can be stacked and the regression can be run using 2SLS.
7   
Throughout the second stage of the estimation the first stage estimates are treated 
as known constants.
8  To reduce notation in the following discussion, let δ  represent the 
first stage results plus all the data on attributes of locations:  [ ] t w g p , , , ; , , ν η β δ = . 
 
  Second Stage Estimation 
 
The estimator uses an iterative process to simultaneously recover all the second-stage 
parameters.  The iterative structure is based on solving for a point estimate of ρ .  On the 
first iteration, a starting value (
0 ρ ) is used to solve for a vector of unobserved public 
goods (
0 0
1 ,..., J ξ ξ ) which are then used together with 
0 ρ  to partition preference space.  
The resulting partition,  () θ γ α , ,
0 A , is used to evaluate an objective function that equals 
                                                 
7 Alternatively, if the error terms are expected to be correlated across quantiles, the estimation could be 
performed using GMM or using SUR with restrictions on the parameters across equations. 
8 Alternatively, endpoints of a confidence interval on each parameter in (16) could be used to place bounds 
on the second stage parameters.     17
zero at the true value of ρ .  Then, the value of the objective function is used to choose a 
new value for the CES parameter (
1 ρ ) to be used during the second iteration.  This 
process terminates when additional changes in ρ  do not lead to further improvements in 
the objective function.  The remainder of this subsection first describes how  J ξ ξ ,..., 1  and 
() θ γ α , , A  are identified conditional on a value for ρ  and then describes the objective 
function used to identify ρ . 
If unobserved public goods influence households’ location choices, they should 
also influence the price of housing.  Under the maintained assumption that households 
have nonnegative preferences for public goods, the price of housing will be strictly 
increasing in unobserved public goods as in (17.a).








ξ N g g p
.   (17.b)  1 1,..., − ⊥ N g g ξ . 
 
If (17.a) holds, the price of housing in each community that was recovered as a fixed 
effect in (14) should contain information about the provision of public goods in that 
community.  More precisely, after controlling for the variation in the price index due to 
observed public goods, the remaining variation can be attributed to unobserved public 
goods.  However, theory does not suggest a functional form for the relationship between 
p and  ξ , ,..., 1 1 − N g g .  Importantly, the function need not be separable in observed and 
unobserved public goods.  Given this indeterminacy, the strategy used here is to impose 
the additional independence restriction in (17.b) which allows ξ  to be recovered 
nonparametrically whether the price index is separable or nonseparable in the public 
goods.  
 When (17.a) and (17.b) hold, Matzkin (2003) implies that the quantiles of the 
distribution of the unobserved public good will equal the quantiles of the price 
                                                 
 
9 Bajari and Benkard (2005) prove a hedonic price function exists and is strictly increasing in ξ  if utility 
satisfies differentiability, continuity, and nonsatiation in ξ  and the numeraire.  These conditions are 
satisfied for (12).   18
distribution, conditional on observed public goods.  This result is shown as (18).   
 
(18)   () () ( ) [ ] j j g g p j g g p j g f F p F F
j j ξ ξ ξ , | | = = = = . 
 
A variety of nonparametric methods can be used to map the price of housing in each 
community into its corresponding quantile in the distribution of prices, conditional on 
observed public goods.  Regardless of the method used, the estimated quantiles represent 
a monotonic transformation of the unobserved characteristic itself since, assuming ξ  has 
a continuous distribution, it can be normalized such that its marginal distribution is 
U[0,1].  This normalization implies  ( ) j F ξ ξ ξ = .  
Importantly, the estimated values of ξ  and ρ  must permit the indirect utility 
function to explain every observed location choice.  In other words, each location must 
maximize utility for some set of values for the heterogeneous parameters.  This requires a 
certain degree of smoothness in the relationship between the price of housing and the 
unobserved public good.
10  In practice, the minimum bandwidth that provides this 
smoothness may exceed the bandwidth that would otherwise be chosen to address the 
bias/efficiency tradeoff from estimating (18).  In the estimation, this is treated as a 
constraint on the bandwidth.  The estimator starts with an approximation to the optimal 
bandwidth.  Then, if necessary, the bandwidth is increased until the estimator finds values 
for the heterogeneous parameters that justify every observed location choice.   
Given δ ,  J ξ ξ ,..., 1 , and a value for ρ , location choices can be expressed as a 
function of preferences for public goods, the opportunity cost of time, and unobserved 
job skill.  The partitioning process inverts this relationship, using the logic of revealed 
preferences to recover values for the heterogeneous parameters that rationalize observed 
location choices.  This step of the estimation manifests Tiebout’s logic that location 
choices reveal preferences.   
                                                 
10 This is a common feature of pure characteristics-based models such as Feenstra and Levinsohn (1995), 
Epple, Peress, and Sieg (2005), and Bajari and Benkard (2005).  Alternatively, in applications of the 
random parameters logit model such as Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) and Bayer, McMillan, and 
Reuben (2005) the idiosyncratic logit error terms “pick up the slack” in explaining choices.   19
The borders that delineate the partition of preference space are implicitly defined 
by the system of equations that arise from applying the boundary indifference condition 
in equation (9) to the indirect utility function in (12).  This system is nonlinear.  
Consequently, the borders cannot be expressed analytically and when preference space 
exceeds two dimensions it is infeasible to solve for them numerically.  Instead, the 
estimator recovers an approximation to the partition of preference space by sampling over 
it uniformly.
11     
The sampling is done by a Gibbs algorithm that takes a large number of uniform 
draws from each region of the partition.  For example, suppose we want to sample 
uniformly over region  3 , i A  of the partition in figure 2.  To start the Gibbs sampler, one 
must first locate a point somewhere in  3 , i A .  In the figure, the starting value is denoted by 
*0.  The first step is to condition on all but one coordinate and solve for bounds on the 
remaining coordinate.  In the figure, this is done by conditioning on  air γ  and solving for 
the bounds on α , which are 0.96 and 2.55.   Use these bounds to take a random uniform 
draw.  Suppose the result is  3 . 2 = α .  From here, condition on  3 . 2 = α , solve for the 
bounds in the  air γ  dimension, and take a random uniform draw on  air γ .  In the figure, the 
new bounds are 0.0 and 0.4, and the new uniform draw is 0.15.  Together, the two 
conditional uniform draws (2.3, 0.15) define the first unconditional draw from the region, 
*1.  This process can be repeated, using *1 to find *2 and so on.  The result is a randomly 
chosen uniform distribution of points within  3 , i A  that approximates its shape.
 12   
Operationally, the process of partitioning preference space relies on the three 
conditions used to characterize sorting behavior in the theoretical model.  Non-decreasing 
bundles identifies locations that have adjacent regions in the partition.  Boundary 
indifference defines the borders that delineate those regions, and stratification guarantees 
that each region is connected in ( ) θ γ α , , ˆ | y . 
                                                 
11 Similar methods have been used in different empirical contexts under the simplifying assumption of a 
linear utility function (Feenstra and Levinsohn [1995]; Bajari and Benkard [2005]). 
12 See Geweke (1996) for a general description of Gibbs sampling and see the supplemental appendix to 



















FIGURE 2.—Using the Gibbs Sampling Algorithm to Partition Preference Space 
 
While observed location choices are sufficient to identify  ρ ξ ξ | ,..., 1 J , and 
() ρ θ γ α | , , A , they are not sufficient to separately identify ρ ,  J ξ ξ ,..., 1 , and  () θ γ α , , A  
without some prior knowledge of the relationship between preferences and income.  This 
information can be supplied by specifying a parametric form for their joint distribution 
(Epple and Sieg [1999]) or assuming they are independent for a subset of households 
(Epple, Peress, and Sieg [2005]).  The later approach is illustrated here.  
All else constant, the interaction between ρ  and  y ˆ  in the CES indirect utility 
function dictates how income shocks affect the desired bundle of housing and public 
goods.  This relationship can be inverted to identify ρ  from the location choices made by 
households that are identical except for their non-wage income.  Put differently, the 
observed stratification by income of (otherwise) identical households reveals the extent to 
which they substitute public goods with the private good component of housing.    
Let  () θ γ α , , s F  denote the distribution of the heterogeneous parameters for a 
subset of households, s, for which  y Fs ˆ ⊥ .  Suppose this subset can be further divided 
into two groups with non-wage income 1 ˆ y  and 2 ˆ y .  Sampling over the corresponding   21
partitions will produce two approximations to  s F :  1 ,
~
s F  and  2 ,
~
s F .  These conditional 
distributions will equal the unconditional distribution when the partitioning process is 
performed at the true value of the CES parameter,  0 ρ ρ = , as depicted in equation (19). 
 
(19)  ()( )( ) ξ δ ρ θ γ α ξ δ ρ θ γ α θ γ α , , , ˆ | , , ~ , , , ˆ | , , ~ , , 2 2 , 1 1 , y F y F F s s s = = ,  for 2 1 ˆ ˆ y y ≠ .  
 
The equalities will not hold for other values of the CES parameter.  This follows from the 
observation that the boundary indifference loci defining the partition of preference space 
are nonseparable in () y ˆ , ρ .  A movement in ρ  away from its true value will distort the 
boundaries of the partition to a different extent for 1 ˆ y  and 2 ˆ y , leading to predictions for 
1 , s F  and  2 , s F  that differ from the true distribution and from each other:  s s s F F F ≠ ≠ 2 , 1 ,
~ ~ .  
The estimator applies this logic to recover the value of ρ  that minimizes the predicted 
difference between  1 , s F  and  2 , s F , as shown in equation (20).   
 
(20)  () ( ) ξ δ ρ θ γ α ξ δ ρ θ γ α
ρ , , , ˆ | , , ~ , , , ˆ | , , ~ min 2 2 , 1 1 , y F y F s s − . 
 
  This equation provides a general expression for the objective function that forms 
the basis for the second stage of the estimation.  If location choices can be observed for s-
type households at more than two income levels, the efficiency of the estimation may be 
improved by minimizing the difference between the predicted distributions for all 
pairwise combinations of income.  In general, evaluating the objective function requires 
partitioning preference space at each of the  D d ,..., 1 =  income levels and then sampling 
from those partitions to obtain  D s s F F , 1 ,
~ ,..., ~ .  This process must be repeated, updating ρ on 
each step, until the relevant convergence criteria are satisfied.   
 
4.  DATA 
The model was estimated using data from Northern California’s two largest population 
centers: the San Francisco and Sacramento Consolidated Metropolitan Statistical Areas 
(CMSA).  Together, the two CMSAs contain about 9 million people, roughly 25% of the   22
state’s population and 3% of the U.S. population.  The region is largely self-contained.  
Only 1.5% of its workforce commutes to a job outside the region.  While the two CMSAs 
are adjacent, their major business districts are 80 to 120 miles apart—far enough to limit 
commuting, but close enough that most households could move from one to the other 
without alienating family and friends, or having to readjust to a dramatically different 
environment.  The closeness between the regions is also apparent in data on recent 
movers.  Between 1995 and 2000, San Francisco was the top destination for households 
moving out of Sacramento.  Likewise, San Francisco was the top origin of households 
that moved into Sacramento.  Together with physical proximity, these migration patterns 
suggest it is reasonable to treat both CMSAs as part of the same locational choice set.   
The data were generated in three steps.  First, the study region was divided into 
housing communities and work destinations, and the observable component of job skill 
was defined.  Second, the set of all possible job-house combinations was reduced to a set 
of admissible locations, and for each of these the distribution of non-wage income by 
occupation was obtained.  Finally, data were obtained for a set of characteristics that 
differentiate communities and jobs.  Each step is briefly described before proceeding to 
the estimation results, with additional details provided in a supplemental appendix 
available on the author’s website.      
As in most sorting applications, housing communities are defined as unified 
school districts.  Exceptions are made for primary and secondary districts that do not 
belong to a unified district, and for the city of San Francisco which was divided into 11 
supervisorial districts.
13  The resulting housing component of the choice set contains 122 
communities.  Work destinations are defined as Primary Metropolitan Statistical Areas 
(PMSA), which resemble distinct labor markets.
14  Figure 3A shows how the region is 
divided into eight PMSAs and the density of Census tracts (overlaid on figure 3A) 
illustrates that the population is mostly concentrated around the San Francisco Bay and 
                                                 
13 All public schools in San Francisco are incorporated into a single school district, which comprises 10% 
of the total population in the study area.   
14 The Census Bureau describes a PMSA as “a large urbanized county or cluster of counties…that 
demonstrate very strong internal economic and social links, in addition to close ties to other portions of the 
larger area [CMSA]”.   23
the city of Sacramento.  Finally, a household’s job skills are classified according to the 
occupational category of its primary earner, using the 22 occupational categories in the 
Standard Occupational Classification System (e.g. managers, healthcare support 
workers, etc.).




















































































































































































































































































A. Primary Metro Areas & Census Tracts      B. School Districts & Monitoring Stations 
 
FIGURE 3.—The Regional Landscape 
 
The set of all possible community-PMSA combinations was reduced to 268 
admissible locations which comprise the choice set used to estimate the model.  The 
criterion used to define an admissible location is that it must account for at least 500 
working households (0.02% of the working population).  This rule effectively excludes 
multiple-hour commutes between opposite ends of the study region, and most commuting 
between the two CMSAs.  99% of working households live in the 268 admissible 
locations.  For each of these locations, distributions of non-wage income by occupation 
were generated from publicly available special tabulations of Census data.  For each 
community, data were collected on the price of housing and the provision of two public 
goods, air quality and school quality.  Then for all the admissible work locations 
associated with each community, data were collected on the mean wage rate and mean 
                                                 
15 60% of married couples in the study region reported both the husband and wife working in 1999.  While 
a dual-earner job search would be an interesting extension, it is not possible given present data limitations. 
   24
commuting time for workers in each occupational category. 
Data on individual housing transactions were compiled from records in the 
Assessor’s office of each county and contain the price and characteristics of most houses 
sold in the region between 1995 and 2005.  These data were filtered to eliminate 
observations with apparent errors, those lacking information on structural characteristics, 
nonresidential properties, and outliers—specifically the most expensive and least 
expensive 0.5% of sales.  The resulting data set contains 540,642 housing transactions 
which were converted into annual rents using the formula suggested by Poterba (1992).    
  Ozone concentrations are used as a proxy for air quality.  Ozone is an attractive 
proxy because it is the chief component of urban smog which, for households, is perhaps 
the most readily observable measure of air quality.  The California Air Resources Board 
records hourly concentrations of ozone at monitoring stations throughout the state.  
Figure 3B overlays the location of 210 monitoring stations on school districts in the study 
region.  The ozone measure used in this analysis is the average of the top 30 1-hour daily 
maximum readings (in parts per million) recorded at each monitoring station during the 
course of a year.  Households are assumed to be primarily concerned with air quality near 
their home, not their job.  Under this assumption, community-specific measures are 
constructed by first assigning to each house the ozone measure recorded at the nearest 
monitoring station, and then taking an average over all the houses in the community.  
Then, to control for annual fluctuation in ozone levels, the process was repeated for 1999, 
2000, and 2001, and the results averaged.  The final measure ranges from 0.031 in the 
highest air quality community to 0.106 in the lowest.   
Data on school quality come from the California Department of Education.  The 
measure used in this study is the Academic Performance Index (API), a composite index 
of standardized test scores, weighted across all subjects and grade levels.  For each 
community in the study region, a three-year average API was constructed by weighting 
the score of each school in the community by its number of students from 1999-2001.  
The resulting measure ranges from 528 to 941.  Table I reports summary statistics for the 
API and other community characteristics.                      25
 
TABLE I 
Descriptive Statistics for 122 Housing Communities 
Observed Attribute Source Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Community Size (population share) Census 0.008 0.008 5.45E-05 0.047
Ozone (parts per million) CA Air Resources Board 0.069 0.015 0.031 0.106
Academic Performance Index CA Dept. of Education 706 93 528 941
Household Total Income (25
th quantile) Census 36,241 12,195 10,548 77,705
Household Total Income (50
th quantile) Census 65,112 21,195 27,446 147,630
Household Total Income (75
th quantile) Census 105,580 33,698 55,155 226,330
Annual Housing Expenditures (25
th quantile) Dataquick 27,825 12,565 9,156 88,082
Annual Housing Expenditures (50
th quantile) Dataquick 37,275 16,240 12,166 100,280
Annual Housing Expenditures (75
th quantile) Dataquick 48,345 21,127 16,407 123,620
 
 
For each occupational category and PMSA, mean annual wages were obtained 
from the California Employment Development Department.
16  Wages can very 
substantially between PMSAs, even for aggregate job categories.  Workers with jobs in 
the construction and excavation category are paid 32% more in San Jose than in 
Sacramento, for example.  Some of this variation may reflect local cost-of-living 
adjustments in markets where housing is particularly expensive, like San Jose and San 
Francisco.  The variation may also reflect unobserved heterogeneity in the mix of jobs 
within each category, or location-specific attributes of jobs.   
Finally, data on the mean time for every tract-to-tract commute were taken from 
the Census Transportation Planning Package special tabulation.  These figures were used 
to calculate an average travel time between each home community and PMSA, weighted 
by the share of workers making each tract-to-tract commute.  The resulting average one-
way commute time ranges from 1 to 114 minutes, with a mean of 36 minutes and a 
standard deviation of 19 minutes.  Traffic is a major contributor to the relatively high 
average commute time.  Most workers (82%) live and work in the same PMSA.   
 
                                                 
16 Wages include base pay, production bonuses, tips, and cost-of-living adjustments, but exclude 
nonproduction bonuses, overtime pay and the value of benefits. 
    26
 
5.  RESULTS 
This section compares the results from implementing the new “dual-market” estimator to 
the results from two special cases—the Epple-Sieg model, and an intermediate version of 
the model that admits horizontal differentiation but treats wage income as exogenous.  In 
the dual-market case, the choice set consists of the 268 (housing community, labor 
market) combinations and a household’s income varies across locations depending on the 
occupation of its primary earner and the required commute time.  This framework nests 
the other two versions of the model as special cases.  The intermediate “single-market 
horizontal” model restricts income to be exogenous so that households only choose 
among the 122 communities.  Finally, the “single-market vertical” case restricts income 
to be exogenous, preferences to be vertically differentiated, and the joint distribution of 
income and preferences to be lognormal.  This is the Epple-Sieg model.  The three 
models can be formally related in terms of equation (12), the dual-market indirect utility 
function.  The single-market horizontal version of the model drops the job skill and time 
cost parameters ( 2 , 1 , , i i θ θ ) so that total household income is invariant to location choice.  
This same restriction is imposed in the vertical model, which also assumes 
() y f , α ~lognormal and drops the i subscripts from ( ) N γ γ γ ,...., , 2 1 .    
Since the differences between the three versions of the model do not affect 
J p p ,..., 1  and  ν η β , , , the first stage of the estimation was only performed once.  
Similarly, the second stage of the estimation was performed simultaneously for the two 
horizontal models; in other words the same estimates for ρ  and  122 1,...,ξ ξ  were used to 
recover an approximation to the partition preference space for the single and dual-market 
models.  The only difference is that two additional dimensions of preference space were 
partitioned in the dual-market case ( 2 1,θ θ ).  This isolates the way that including job 
opportunities in the model affects the resulting partition of preference space.  Finally, in 
the single-market vertical case, the second-stage parameters were estimated using the 
GMM approach developed by Sieg et al. (2004).  Comparing the results to those from the   27
two horizontally differentiated models provides the means to evaluate the economic 
implications of introducing horizontally differentiated preferences and job opportunities 
into the Epple-Sieg sorting framework, while simultaneously relaxing their lognormal 
assumption on the joint distribution of income and preferences. 
 
5.1.  First Stage Estimation Results 
 
In the first stage of the estimation, the 540,642 observations on individual real estate 
transactions were used along with income distributions for each community to estimate 
an index of housing prices and the homogeneous housing demand parameters.  First, 
equation (14) was estimated by regressing the sale price of a home on the number of 
bedrooms, number of bathrooms, lot sizes, building sizes, age of each house, a dummy 
variable for condominiums, and a set of community-specific fixed effects.
17  The 
community-specific fixed effects recovered from the regression indicate that housing in 
the most expensive community costs 6.5 times as much as in the cheapest community.   
After normalizing by the lowest price, the index ranges from 1.00 in Sacramento’s Grant 
Union high school district to 6.51 in San Francisco’s second supervisorial district.
18 
Overall, the distribution is consistent with the conventional wisdom that the Bay Area is 
an expensive place to live.  The 11 cheapest communities are all located in the 
Sacramento PMSA, while 24 of the 25 most expensive communities are in the San 
Francisco and San Jose PMSAs.  Despite the spatial concentration of communities with 
extreme values for the price index, there is considerable variation within most PMSAs.  
The price of housing varies by more than 100% between the most expensive and least 
expensive communities in Oakland, San Francisco, San Jose, and Vallejo.  Furthermore, 
these ranges overlap for 21 of the 29 possible PMSA pairings.  
The housing price index was used together with data on the distribution of income 
and housing expenditures in each community to estimate the demand for the private good 
                                                 
17 All continuous variables were measured in logarithms.  The regression, which also included interactions 
of the dependent variables, had an R
2 of 0.81. Complete results are reported in the supplemental appendix. 
18 San Francisco’s 2
nd supervisorial district comprises the area just southeast of the Golden Gate Bridge, 
including the city’s affluent Marina district.   28
component of housing.  Specifically, equation (16) was estimated by regressing quantiles 
from the distribution of annualized housing expenditures in each community on the price 




th quantiles were used.  As discussed earlier, there is reason to expect both 
prices and income may be endogenous.  Therefore the expenditure function was 
estimated using 2SLS in addition to OLS.  The 2SLS regression used the observed public 
goods as instruments for the price of housing and the 25
th, 50
th, and 75
th quantiles from 
the distribution of non-wage income as instruments for total income.  Table II reports the 
results.   
 
TABLE II 
















price  =  f(ozone, score)         






Including instruments in the regression produces a modest increase in the income 
elasticity and a modest decrease in the price elasticity relative to OLS.  As the elasticities 
increase in absolute magnitude the demand intercept decreases.  The estimates for the 
price elasticity are similar to the results from previous sorting applications.  For example, 
the 2SLS estimate () 38 . 0 ˆ − = η  falls near the middle of the range reported in the existing 
literature ( 01 . 0 −  to  70 . 0 − ).
19  While the corresponding estimate for the income 
elasticity () 66 . 0 ˆ = ν  falls slightly below the range of results from previous studies (0.73 
to 0.94), their 95% confidence intervals overlap.   
                                                 
19 This includes all sorting applications that have estimated (16) directly or included it as a moment 
condition in GMM estimation: Epple and Sieg (1999), Walsh (2007), Sieg et al. (2004), and Epple et al. 
(2005).  Polinsky (1977) reports a lower range of estimates (-0.87 to -0.67) in his summary of consistent 
micro models.  However, unlike the sorting literature, these earlier studies did not control for variation in 
the structural characteristics of homes.     29
 
5.2.  Second Stage Estimation Results: Single-Market Vertical Model 
 
If wage income is exogenous, households have identical relative preferences for different 
public goods, and the shape of the joint distribution of income and preferences is known 
to be lognormal, then all the remaining structural parameters can be estimated 
simultaneously using the GMM estimator developed by Sieg et al. (2004).  Table III 
reports the results from using their estimator to recover the CES parameter, the 
parameters that characterize the joint lognormal distribution of income and preferences, 
and the constant weight on air quality in the public goods index.
20     
 
TABLE III 
Second-Stage Parameter Estimates: Single-Market Vertical Model 
mean        
ln(y)
standard 
deviation     
ln(y)















11.103 0.779 0.916 0.754 -0.491 -0.022 0.125
(0.00) (0.00) (0.27) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.82)
 
 
Most of the parameters in table III are precisely estimated and similar in 
magnitude to the results in Sieg et al.  The negative correlation between income and 
preferences for public goods ( 0 < λ ) reflects the fact that there is considerable overlap in 
the community-specific income distributions.  Alternatively, if λ  were positive, the 
model would predict almost no overlap in the range of income within different 
communities.  The negative value for ρ  indicates the elasticity of substitution between 
public and private goods is less than one, which implies the marginal willingness-to-pay 
for public goods is increasing in income.  This is consistent with the single-crossing 
restriction on preferences, providing a consistency check on the theoretical model.   
                                                 
20 The residual to one of the moment conditions defines the composite unobserved public good in each 
community.  The estimation process also recovers the overall level of public goods provision in the 
cheapest community as an incidental parameter.  Its estimated value was 0.310 (0.158).  Following Seig et 
al., the weight on school quality was normalized to one.     30
Recall that in a vertically differentiated model households can be ordered along an 
interval according to their preferences for public goods.  Figure 4 illustrates part of the 






FIGURE 4.—Preference Regions, Single-Market Vertical Case 
 
These results imply that a household with  58 . 0 < α  and an annual income of $67,500 
will maximize its utility by purchasing housing in Grant Joint Union high whereas a 
household with the same income and  16 . 17 > α  will purchase housing in San Francisco’s 
second supervisorial district. 
The positive value for  air γ  in table III indicates that, all else held constant, 
households with higher values for α  will be willing to pay more for a small 
improvement in air quality.  However,  air γ  is not precisely estimated.  The maintained 
assumption that identifies  air γ  in Seig et al.’s estimation strategy is that unobserved 
public goods are of “second order” importance.  In other words, ξ  is assumed to affect 
households’ location choices without affecting the price ranking of communities.  The 
new horizontal estimation framework relaxes this requirement.     
 
5.3.  Second Stage Estimation Results: Single-Market Horizontal Model 
 
Implementing the horizontal estimator requires identifying a subset of households for 
whom preferences and income are independent.  Using only those households, the 
(iterative) estimation can be performed to obtain consistent estimates for ρ , ξ , and an 
approximation to the partition of preference space that rationalizes the location choices 
made by those households.  Then, treating the estimates for ρ  and ξ  as known 
constants, preference space can be partitioned once for the remaining households.  This 
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strategy was used to recover ρ  and ξ  from data on retired households.   
Retired households were a strategic choice for two reasons.  First, they seem least 
likely to violate the independence assumption.  The observation that children in private 
schools tend to come from higher-income families would seem to imply we should 
expect a negative correlation between income and strength of preferences for local public 
school quality.
21  This is less likely to be true for retired households who have fewer 
school-age children.  There is also no obvious reason to expect correlation between their 
income and preferences for other public goods.  Poor air quality should affect retirees’ 
health regardless of income.  The second strategic advantage of using retired households 
is that they bridge the single and dual-market versions of the model.  Generalizing the 
urban landscape to include labor markets does not affect the choice set faced by retirees; 
their income is fixed.   Since retirees choose from the same 122 communities in both 
versions of the model, both models should return the same information about their 
preferences.  This requires both models to produce the same estimates for ρ  and ξ , 
which is guaranteed if they are estimated from data on retired households.   
To implement the second-stage of the estimation, all households were classified 
according to 10 income bins reported in the Census data, and each household was 
assigned a level of income equal to the midpoint of its bin.
22  Then, the objective function 
used to estimate ρ  was defined as the sum of the difference in the marginal distributions 
of  ( ) ξ γ γ γ α , , , school air F  for all pairwise combinations of income for retired households.  
The function was minimized using a grid search over [-.6, 0], which includes the range of 
estimates from previous studies.  The function was minimized at  118 . 0 − = ρ .  While this 
estimate is more than 5 times as large as the result from the vertical model (-0.022), they 
imply similar values for the elasticity of substitution between public and private goods.  
Here, the elasticity is 0.89 compared to 0.98 in the vertical case.
23  
Estimates for the distribution of unobserved public goods are also very similar 
                                                 
21 Within the study region, the average income of households with children enrolled in private schools is 
42% higher than for those enrolled in public schools according to year 2000 Census School District data.  
22 Measured in thousands, the midpoints are: [ 5   12.5   22.5   35   45   55   67.5   87.5   112.5   175 ]. 
23 The elasticity of substitution is defined as:  ( ) ρ σ − = 1 1 .   32
between the vertical and horizontal models.  The average community differs by 6 places 
in the ranking by ξ  between the two models.  Overall, ξ  becomes increasingly important 
in explaining location choices as one moves closer to the San Francisco Bay.  Some of 
the unobserved public goods that seem likely to be influencing the spatial pattern of ξ  
include climate, open space, and cultural amenities.  The San Francisco Bay Area 
generally has the mildest weather in the study region and the most opportunities for 
dining and nightlife.  The Bay Area also has a relatively large share of land in open 
space.  The San Francisco, San Jose, and Santa Cruz PMSAs have the highest median 
values for ξ  and the largest share of land in state parks.  This pattern is consistent with 
previous sorting applications which have found open space to be an important 
determinant of where households locate (Walsh [2007]).   
Using the estimates for ρ  and ξ , the Gibbs algorithm recovered an 
approximation to the partition of preference space defined by 1,220,000 points—1000 
points drawn from each of the 122 regions at 10 different levels of income.
24  Recall from 
section 2 that the logic of revealed preferences may not fully bound regions that 
correspond to locations with extreme provision of public goods.  Therefore, absolute 
upper and lower bounds had to be imposed on each dimension to ensure that the points 
were drawn from the “economically relevant” portion of the unbounded regions.   
The job skill parameter ( 1 θ ) was bounded by 0 and 1.5.  Its lower bound implies 
the worker’s idiosyncratic skills prevent them from gaining employment in any location 
other than their current niche, whereas its upper bound implies the worker is 
overqualified at their current job and could make 150% of the market wage in alternative 
job locations.   2 θ  was bounded by 0 and 1, allowing a worker’s opportunity cost of time 
to range from 0 to their wage rate.  The weights in the public goods index were 
normalized to sum to 1, allowing the bounds for α  to be set based on prior assumptions 
about the range of plausible values for the MWTP.  The lower bound on α  was set to 0, 
restricting MWTP for public goods to be nonnegative.  Its upper bound was set to 
                                                 
24 This followed a burn-in of 100 draws to reduce sensitivity to starting values.   33
correspond to a $500 MWTP for improved air quality.  More precisely, the upper bound 
on α  sets a $500 limit on an individual household’s willingness-to-pay for a 1 part per 
billion (ppb) reduction in the annual average of the top 30 1-hour daily maximum 
readings for ozone concentrations.  This measure is not directly comparable with 
estimates for the MWTP in much of the existing literature where air quality is typically 
measured by particulate matter or by the number of days during a year that ozone levels 
exceed state or federal standards.  However, to the extent that all of these measures are 
simply different proxies for clean air, they can be compared in terms of a common 
proportionate change.  Sieg et al. (2004) use this logic to translate the range of estimates 
for the average MWTP in the existing literature into measures that would be comparable 
to the willingness-to-pay for a 1.5 ppb reduction in ozone concentrations.  Converted to 
year 2000 dollars, the range is $11 to $231.  Measured in these normalized units, the 
upper bound on α  would imply a value of $750.  Thus, the upper bound limits an 
individual household’s MWTP to roughly triple the upper bound on average MWTP in 
the existing literature.           
The resulting partition generalizes the revealed preference logic from the vertical 
model.  This can be seen by comparing the preference regions that each model assigns to 
households living in three communities—Pittsburg, Milpitas, and Sunol Glen.  Of the 
three, Sunol Glen and Milpitas provide more of every public good than Pittsburg.
25  
Therefore, regardless of relative preferences, every household will perceive Pittsburg as 
providing the lowest quality bundle of public goods.  Given this unanimous ordering, a 
household’s choice to live in Pittsburg reveals that they have weaker preferences for 
public goods relative to private goods compared to households with the same income in 
the other two communities. This logic is reflected by the stratification of households in 
figure 4 and figure 5A.  In both figures, the preference sets for Sunol Glen and Milpitas 
lie above the set for Pittsburg in the α  dimension.  However notice that, unlike figure 4, 
households in Sunol Glen and Milpitas have overlapping ranges of values for α  in figure 
                                                 
25 The normalized values for {air quality, school quality, ξ , price} in each community are as follows: 
Pittsburg {0.82, 0.79, 0.16, 1.42}; Milpitas {0.96, 1.05, 0.5, 2.61}; Sunol Glen {0.91, 1.20, 0.49, 2.62}.   34
5.  This occurs because the two communities are not strictly ordered by their provision of 
public goods.  Sunol Glen has higher quality schools and Milpitas has cleaner air.  
Otherwise they are nearly identical; the price of housing and provision of ξ  differ by 
approximately 1% between the two communities.  Thus, the choice between Sunol Glen 
and Milpitas helps to identify households’ preferences for air quality relative to school 
quality.  This logic underlies the result in figure 5B that households in Sunol Glen have 
strictly higher relative preferences for school quality.  
 
   
A.   γ α,  space | y=$67,500              B.  Projection in γ  space     
   
FIGURE 5.—Preference Regions for 3 Communities, Single-Market Horizontal Case 
 
More generally, the size and shape of each preference region reflects the 
substitution possibilities available to the households in the corresponding community.
26  
Preferences are better identified for households that live in communities with closer 
substitutes.  For example, there are at least five other communities that are very similar to 
Milpitas in their provision of air and school quality.  Consequently, Milpitas has a small 
preference region compared to Pittsburg and Sunol Glen which have fewer close 
                                                 
26 While the Gibbs algorithm sampled uniformly over each preference region, there appears to be 
sparseness near some of the edges in figure 5B.  For examples, see the upper left corner of Pittsburg and the 
right corner of Sunol Glen.  In both cases, the preference regions are approximately pyramidal and the 
sparseness occurs in the tip which would be consistent with a uniform density of points.   35
neighbors in public goods space.   
 
5.4.  Second Stage Estimation Results: Dual-Market Horizontal Model 
 
In the dual-market version of the model, the approximation to the partition of preference 
space is defined by 58,960,000 points—1000 points drawn from each of the 268 regions 
for each of the 220 (occupation, non-wage income) pairs.  The main difference from the 
single-market partition is that adding work destinations to the choice set expands the 
borders of the preference sets.  Intuitively, heterogeneity in job skill and the opportunity 
cost of time provide new ways to explain observed location choices.   
Figure 6 provides a representative example of how the preference regions differ.  
Panels A, B, and C project the preference sets recovered for architects and engineers in 
the Acalanes school district onto  school air γ γ ,  space.  In the single-market case (panel A) 
the choice to live in Acalanes reveals strong preferences for school quality relative to air 
quality because Acalanes has high quality schools (90
th percentile) and low quality air 
(14
th percentile).  Of all the possible job destinations for architects and engineers who live 
there, the Oakland PMSA requires the shortest commute (24 minutes).  Therefore, the 
choice to live in Oakland may reveal a high opportunity cost of time rather than strong 
preferences for school quality.  This possibility is reflected in the way the preference 
region in panel B is “stretched” to the left compared to panel A.  The lowest values for 
school γ  correspond to high values for the opportunity cost of time parameter ( 2 θ ).  In 
contrast, the preference region is stretched to the right for workers who make the 
relatively long commute to San Francisco (55 minutes).  In this case, the highest values 
for  school γ  are paired with low values for the job mobility parameter ( 1 θ ).  For an architect 
or engineer who is “stuck” working in San Francisco, the choice to live far from their job 
reveals strong preferences for the public goods provided by that community—in this case 
school quality.    
   36
 
                  A.  Acalanes      B.  Acalanes Æ Oakland             C.  Acalanes Æ San Francisco    
           (single-market)                           (24 mins, wage=$57,700)                (55 mins, wage=$58,500) 
 
FIGURE 6.—Stratification by Relative Preferences with and without Job Choices 
 
To make a more general comparison between the single and dual-market 
partitions, each was translated into a distribution of preferences by sampling uniformly 
over each region according to the population of households in the corresponding 
community.
27  For example, the census data report 232 households with a primary earner 
in the architecture and engineering occupation who live in the Acalanes school district, 
work in the Oakland PMSA, and have total income of $112,500.  Therefore, 232 draws 
were chosen uniformly from the region of the partition that corresponds to this household 
“type”.   This process was repeated for every household type so that the resulting 
distributions represent all 3.2 million households in the study region.  Table IV reports 
means and standard deviations that describe the marginal distribution of each parameter.   
In the dual-market case, the means for α ,  air γ  and  school γ  are all slightly larger 
and the mean for  ξ γ  is slightly smaller.  Intuitively, without job opportunities to help 
explain location choices, the single-market version of the model has to assign more 
importance to unobserved public goods to rationalize observed behavior.  The larger 
standard deviations on  air γ ,  school γ , and  ξ γ  in the dual-market case reflect the way that 
job opportunities tend to widen the bounds on the preference regions.  The mean value 
for  1 θ  suggests a high degree of geographic job specialization; it implies the average 
worker would earn approximately half of the market wage if they were to change job 
                                                 
27 This does not imply preferences are uniformly distributed within the population of households.   37
locations.  Another interpretation would be that this relatively low value reflects a high 
job search cost.  Of all the heterogeneous parameters,  2 θ  has the most straightforward 
interpretation.  Its mean value of 0.398 implies the mean shadow value of time is 
approximately 40% of the wage rate.  This is quite similar to the rule-of-thumb (33%) 
that is often used in recreation demand studies (Phaneuf and Smith [2005]).   
 
TABLE IV 
Mean (standard deviation) for Distributions of the Heterogeneous Parameters 
log (α) γschool γair γξ θ1 θ2
0.916 1.000 0.125
(0.267)
-7.089 0.113 0.138 0.749
(3.907) (0.151) (0.133) (0.197)
-6.980 0.159 0.166 0.675 0.461 0.398
















---- ---- ---- f(α,y)~lognormal
 
 
Table IV also reports the point estimates for α  and  air γ  from the vertical model.  
They are not comparable to the horizontal results in terms of magnitude since they 
correspond to different estimates for ρ  and ξ .  Nevertheless, there is a striking 
difference between the relative values for the (average) weights estimated for the 
horizontal model and the (constant) weights estimated for the vertical model.  The ratio 
of  air γ  to  school γ  in the two horizontal models is an order of magnitude larger than in the 
vertical case.  This could be due to the many differences between the two estimators, or it 
could simply reflect the large standard error on the vertical point estimate for  air γ .   
In summary, the results from each of the three sorting models can be used to 
characterize the distribution of preferences for public goods in the population of 
households who live in the San Francisco-Sacramento area.  The three models differ in 
how they define a locational equilibrium, how they depict heterogeneity in households, 
and in the restrictions they place on the shape of the distributions used to characterize   38
sources of heterogeneity.  The differences in these identifying assumptions lead to 
substantial differences in the information recovered about preferences, as illustrated by 
the summary statistics in table IV and the shape of the partitions in figures 4, 5, and 6. 
 
5.5.  Implications: Marginal Willingness-to-Pay for Improved Air Quality 
 
To compare the economic implications of the three models, the information about 
preferences was translated into distributions of the willingness-to-pay for a marginal (1 
ppb) reduction in ozone concentrations.  For the vertical model, this simply requires 
drawing a sample of households from the joint distribution of income and preferences 
defined by the parameter estimates for  λ σ σ μ μ
α α , , , ,
y y  and converting each draw into 
the corresponding MWTP.  Likewise, the horizontal partitions were translated into 
distributions of MWTP by sampling from each region of preference space according to 
the associated population of households and then converting each draw into the 
corresponding MWTP.  This approach was used to generate three distributions.  First, the 
assumption that preferences are distributed uniformly within each preference region was 
translated into a distribution of MWTP.  Then, upper and lower bounds on that 
distribution were generated.  For example, the lower (upper) bound distribution was 
constructed by assigning every household the lowest (highest) possible MWTP that 
would be consistent with its observed location choice.  Any assumption about the shape 
of the joint distribution of preferences will lead to a distribution of MWTP that falls 
within these bounds.   
The difference between the upper and lower bound distributions can be used to 
measure the economic significance of assumptions on the distribution of preferences.  
Table V reports the share of households within 7 different “identification intervals”.  For 
example, the difference between the highest and lowest MWTP that would be consistent 
with observed location choices lies between $0 and $10 for 3.1% of households in the 
single-market case.  In other words, the MWTP is identified to within $10 for these 
households.  Likewise, the MWTP is identified to within $25 for 16.4% of households 
(3.1% + 13.3%).  Moving from the single to the dual-market case decreases the share of   39
households for whom the MWTP is precisely estimated.  This is consistent with the 
observation that the dual-market preference regions typically have wider bounds.
28   
 
TABLE V 
Identifying MWTP for Improved Air Quality, Horizontal Models 
$0-$10 $10-$25 $25-$50 $50-$75 $75-$100 $100-$250 $250-$500
Single-Market 3.1% 13.3% 22.2% 17.5% 12.0% 20.3% 11.6%
Dual-Market 2.6% 7.3% 12.6% 12.5% 9.3% 23.8% 31.9%
Model
Share of Households with  | max (MWTP) - min (MWTP) |  in the Range: 
 
 
  Table VI provides summary measures of the MWTP distributions and compares 
them to the corresponding results from the vertical model.  The range of estimates for 
average per/household MWTP in the dual market case ($33 to $226) contains the range in 
the single-market case ($57 to $168) which contains the point estimate from the vertical 
model ($83).  This illustrates the economic relevance of the “bias/variance” tradeoff 
described earlier.  That is, if the depiction of utility in the dual-market case represents the 
“truth”, then treating income as exogenous and preferences as vertically differentiated 
will have two effects.  It will bias the resulting welfare measures and it will decrease the 
sensitivity of those measures to assumptions on the distribution of heterogeneous 
preference parameters.  The table also illustrates another general feature of the results: 
conditional on the uniform assumption, introducing horizontal differentiation and 
accounting for job opportunities both tend to increase the MWTP. 
 
TABLE VI 













80 67 122 178 41 140 233
Single-market, 
Vertical
Single-market, Horizontal Dual-market, Horizontal
 
                                                 
28 The upper bound of $500 that was imposed on the two horizontal models truncates the preference regions 
for approximately 6.0% of households in the single-market case, compared to 13.8% in the dual-market 
case.       40
 
  Compared to the results from reduced-form hedonic studies of the housing 
market, the dual-market estimates for the MWTP are relatively high.  Converting the 
range of normalized values for the existing literature into measures that would be 
equivalent to the average MWTP for a 1 ppb ozone reduction implies a range from $7 to 
$154 (year 2000 dollars).  The higher range produced by the dual-market estimator ($41 
to $233) could stem from methodological differences or simply from differences in the 
study region.  The $7 and $154 estimates are both for Los Angeles which has much 
higher ozone concentrations than the San Francisco-Sacramento area (Seig et al. [2004].  
Moreover, median income in the San Francisco CMSA is 35% higher than in the Los 
Angeles CMSA.  If Northern and Southern California were considered as part of the 
same choice set, the relationship between MWTP, air quality, and income would imply 
that households in San Francisco and Sacramento would tend to have a higher MWTP 
than those in Los Angeles.   
  The result that MWTP tends to increase when the choice set is expanded to 
include job opportunities is consistent with the interregional hedonic literature which has 
found that housing prices and wage rates both reflect a substantial share of the implicit 
price of environmental amenities (e.g. Roback [1982], Blomquist et al. [1988]).  These 
applications estimate quality-of-life indices under the assumptions that households have 
homogeneous preferences for public goods and are freely mobile in national markets for 
housing and labor.  Bayer, Keohane and Timmins (2006) extend this literature to relax 
the free mobility assumption and estimate the MWTP for air quality.  Their analysis 
includes a cost for moving between states but, like the present study, they treat 
households as freely mobile within each state.  Converting the point estimate from their 
national model to a measure that would be comparable to a 1 ppb ozone reduction in the 
San Francisco-Sacramento region would imply a MWTP of $224 (year 2000 dollars).
29  
This figure falls within the range of results reported in table VI for the average MWTP in 
                                                 
29 The $224 figure is calculated using the WTP elasticity for particulate matter from the full version of their 
model (0.34).  This calculation assumes particulate matter and ozone can be compared in terms of a 
common proportionate change.        41
the dual-market case despite numerous methodological differences between the two 
studies.  For example, Bayer et al. use metropolitan statistical areas as their spatial unit of 
observation and restrict households to have identical preferences for air quality. 
Finally, from a methodological perspective, the closest comparison to the existing 
literature is to Sieg et al’s (2004) application of the single-market vertical model to Los 
Angeles in 1990.  They report an average MWTP of $66.  However, the average level of 
ozone concentrations across the communities in their application is 150 ppb, compared to 
a maximum of 109 here.  The Sacramento PMSA provides the closest approximation to 
the income and ozone conditions in Los Angeles.  The average level of ozone 
concentrations for the communities physically located in Sacramento is 94 ppb and the 
median income is 1.5% higher than in Los Angeles.  For the households who live in these 
communities, the average MWTP predicted by the single-market vertical model is $23, 
compared to $68 and $79 for the two horizontally differentiated models (under the 
uniform assumption).  The low estimate for the vertical model reflects the fact that the 
communities in the Sacramento PMSA have the lowest housing prices in the study 
region.  Therefore, conditional on income, they are assigned the lowest values for α , 
which imply the lowest values for the MWTP.  The horizontal models also assign 
relatively low values to households in these communities, but recognize that variation in 
relative preferences and job opportunities may induce some households with relatively 
strong preferences for air quality to locate there.   
 
6.  SUMMARY 
This paper has developed a new structural estimator of household preferences for local 
public goods.  By redefining each location as a job-house combination and recognizing 
job skill as an additional dimension of heterogeneity, the model has extended the existing 
sorting literature to consider a dual-market locational equilibrium.  This framework 
recognizes that each working household faces a limited set of job options.  They may be 
forced to choose between lower-amenity communities with cheaper housing and better 
access to high-paying jobs and communities with higher amenities, poorer access, and   42
more expensive housing.  The choices made by households facing this tradeoff reveal 
features of their preferences.     
The new estimator relaxes the vertical differentiation restriction from Epple and 
Sieg (1999) to recognize that households may differ in their relative preferences for 
multiple public goods.  In the application to Northern California, this generalization 
increased estimates of the MWTP for air quality under baseline assumptions about the 
shape of the distributions used to characterize sources of heterogeneity.  Extending the 
model to recognize that working households make a joint job-house choice produced a 
similar increase in MWTP.  This result is consistent with earlier reduced form studies by 
Roback (1982) and Blomquist et al. (1988) that found housing prices and wages both 
reflect a substantial share of the implicit price of environmental amenities.  Overall, the 
impact of moving from Epple and Sieg’s estimator to the new dual-market estimator, in 
terms of average per/household MWTP, ranges from a 50% decrease to a 190% increase, 
depending on assumptions about the shape of the distribution of preferences.  This range 
reflects another key result: all else constant, expanding the dimensionality of preference 
heterogeneity increases the sensitivity of welfare measures to assumptions about the 
shape of the distributions used to characterize sources of heterogeneity.   
The increase in average MWTP under the uniform assumption together with the 
increased sensitivity of that result to extreme distributional assumptions illustrates a type 
of bias/variance tradeoff that applies generally to microeconometric models of the 
demand for a differentiated product.  In the context of Tiebout’s (1956) revealed 
preference logic, this tradeoff implies that while households signal their preferences for 
local public goods by the residential (and job) locations they choose, what we infer from 
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